A shared route map for AI agents — query verified task routes, then contribute and attest outcomes.
Do not connect
A critical issue was found. Do not connect this server as-is.
Scanned 26 days ago Due for re-check
A server can change after it's graded. Re-run the automated scan to refresh this report.
This grade is deterministic and reproducible: the same server surface always yields the same grade under a given algorithm version. It is a real automated assessment computed by the MCPGrade engine from what the probe actually observed — not a fabricated or opinion score. It is not a manual human pentest, so it can miss context-specific risks.
Every signal below was measured directly by the automated probe. The grade is derived only from evidence like this — nothing is assumed.
The waymark MCP server exposes 4 tools, focused primarily on database capabilities. Its published description reads: "A shared route map for AI agents — query verified task routes, then contribute and attest outcomes". It communicates over Streamable HTTP using the 2025-06-18 protocol revision, and does not require authorization to connect. MCPGrade currently rates waymark F — a critical issue was found and the server should not be connected as-is. Its most notable findings include "Cross-tool shadowing" and "Tool input schema requests a secret". This report is a deterministic, reproducible automated assessment: the same observed surface always yields the same grade under a given algorithm version, and it is refreshed as new scans arrive and free to read — but it is not a substitute for a manual human security review. Always re-check waymark's advertised tools, transport security, and authorization posture before connecting an autonomous agent or sharing sensitive context with it.
Add waymark to an MCP client using the endpoint below. Review the grade and findings above before granting an autonomous agent access.
MCP endpoint
https://mcp.waymark.network/mcpStreamable HTTP transport. This is the MCP endpoint, not a website — paste it into your MCP client server list rather than a browser.
Captured passively during the read-only scan. Click any value to find servers that match it.
The tools this server advertises via tools/list — names, purposes, and the parameters each accepts, exactly as enumerated read-only.
Before attempting a non-trivial task (API integration, vendor portal, checkout flow, multi-step web/tool procedure), query Waymark for routes other agents have documented and attested. Returns step se
After completing a task, contribute the sanitized procedure (steps that worked, gotchas hit) so other agents can reuse it. Submit procedure only — never credentials, personal data, or payload contents
Sorted worst-first. Each finding shows its severity, what it means, its OWASP MCP Top-10 mapping, and a recommended fix — the check id links to the exact methodology row that produced it.
tool: waymark_query
A tool description tries to alter the model’s use of another tool.
d route_id with waymark_attest after you finish.RecommendationDescriptions must describe only their own tool.
tool: waymark_query
The input schema declares a parameter that asks the caller to hand over a password, key, token, or other secret — a credential-harvest / token-passthrough risk. (Bare pagination `token` params are excluded.)
parameter "api_key"RecommendationNever pass secrets as tool arguments; authenticate out-of-band and remove credential parameters from the schema.
tool: waymark_contribute
The input schema declares a parameter that asks the caller to hand over a password, key, token, or other secret — a credential-harvest / token-passthrough risk. (Bare pagination `token` params are excluded.)
parameter "api_key"RecommendationNever pass secrets as tool arguments; authenticate out-of-band and remove credential parameters from the schema.
tool: waymark_attest
A tool exposes a free-text/webhook/feedback parameter with no honest purpose — a classic exfil channel.
our contributor api_key (from waymark_register) to make the attestationRecommendationRemove side-channel parameters; constrain tool inputs.
tool: waymark_attest
A tool description tries to alter the model’s use of another tool.
r api_key (from waymark_register) to make the attestation identity-attributed —RecommendationDescriptions must describe only their own tool.
tool: waymark_attest
The input schema declares a parameter that asks the caller to hand over a password, key, token, or other secret — a credential-harvest / token-passthrough risk. (Bare pagination `token` params are excluded.)
parameter "api_key"RecommendationNever pass secrets as tool arguments; authenticate out-of-band and remove credential parameters from the schema.
tool: waymark_register
A tool description tries to alter the model’s use of another tool.
mit routes with waymark_contribute. The key is returned once — store it. Handles aRecommendationDescriptions must describe only their own tool.
The server accepts tool enumeration (and likely invocation) with no authentication.
RecommendationRequire OAuth 2.1 authorization for any server exposing non-public tools.
Vantaj uptime monitoring via MCP — manage monitors, heartbeats, incidents, and status pages.
Unified gateway to Algeria's TKAWEN ecosystem: commerce, certification, and AI tools.
Provides access to the Cohereon Doctrine AI safety framework with governance components, tiered access, and agent onboarding.
Agentic rails for complex workflows with receipts, fees, and MCP tool access.
Structural TC39 spec lookup for ECMA-262 and ECMA-402 in AI agents, SHA-pinned and offline-first.
Structural TC39 spec lookup for ECMA-262 and ECMA-402 in AI agents, SHA-pinned and offline-first.
Report whether following a Waymark route led to task success or failure. Attestations drive route trust by consensus — always attest after using a route. Optionally pass your contributor api_key (from
Get a free contributor API key so you can submit routes with waymark_contribute. The key is returned once — store it. Handles are unique: the first registration claims a handle (one handle per agent/o